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THE LIMITS OF PROPERTY REPARATIONS
Gregory S. Alexander*

One of life’s cruelest lessons is that history repeats itself. Forcible and inhumane
expropriations of property by morally corrupt nations is a particularly unfortunate example of
this lesson. Human history is replete with examples of unjustified expropriations of property by
conquering states and other transitory regimes. Only in modern times, however, have nations
attempted systematically to remedy historical injustices by providing reparations to the
dispossessed owners or their successors. From the aboriginal peoples of the Antipodes to the
Native Americans of Canada and the U.S. to the European victims of the Nazi Germany and
Soviet communism, groups of people who were stripped of their land and possessions by fraud
or force are demanding, and in many cases getting, reparations for these injustices.
The thesis of this paper is that the case for reparations for such expropriations of property
is highly tenuous, both morally and in practical terms. Reparations claims in general face two
serious challenges: human irrationality and the effects of time. While these challenges are not
necessarily insuperable, they are formidable. Most claims are made for reparations for past
expropriations are unable satisfactorily to respond to these challenges. As a result, in my view,
reparations in the form of specific restitution aimed at rectifying past injustices should be paid
only in limited circumstances. This is especially true where the act(s) of expropriation were
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A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. This paper was delivered at a
Conference on Political Transformation, Restitution, and Justice, Jagiellonian University,
Krakow, Poland. I am grateful to my colleague Jeffrey Rachlinski for help clarifying the social
psychological literature on counterfactuals.
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perpetrated many years, even centuries, ago, but it holds true even in the context of more recent
demands by victims (or their representatives) of both Nazi atrocities and Soviet-era
expropriations of property.
Three important caveats are in order. First and foremost, my doubts about reparations in
no way rest upon a judgment that minimizes or trivializes the injustices perpetrated upon those
who suffered as the result of the heinous acts of the Fascists of the so-called Third Reich and the
brutal agents of Soviet states following the end of the Second World War. History will surely
judge the crimes that those victims suffered as among the worst ever experienced as the result of
political ideologies.
Second, I am addressing only the question of compensatory reparations, that is,
reparations aimed at offsetting the losses experienced by victims of illegitimate property
expropriations. My comments in no way are intended to cast doubt on policies of awarding
symbolic reparations, that is, payments or other awards designed not to compensate but to signify
public recognition that a past injustice was perpetrated. Jeremy Waldron has succinctly
expressed the purpose of symbolic reparations this way: “[R]eparations may symbolize a
society’s undertaking not to forget or deny that a particular injustice took place, and to respect
and help sustain a dignified sense of identity-in-memory for the people affected.”1 As Waldron
points out, overt acts of remembrance are necessary for individuals and groups who were victims
of great injustice to vindicate their sense of self and their collective identity. Modest monetary
payments may be both necessary and sufficient to establish a public marker of acknowledgment.
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Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” Ethics 103 (1992): 4-28, 6.
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Third, my argument applies only to reparations that are restitutionary in character. My
comments are limited to reparations claims intended to rectify past injustices by providing
restitution, either in kind or monetary, for illegally and immorally expropriated property.
Restitution is not the only possible purpose of providing reparations. Monetary awards may
serve other purposes as well, including symbolically acknowledging the wrongfulness of the
expropriation and the harm done to the victims of such acts.
What I shall address in the remainder of this paper are reparations of a very different
kind, the kind that is nearly always involved when demands for reparations become the subject
of public controversy. These are what I have already labeled “restitutionary reparation,” that is,
reparations aimed at returning to dispossessed owners what once was rightfully theirs and was
illegally and usually forcefully taken away from them. Theoretically, restitutionary reparations
can take either of two forms, specific restitution and value restitution. Specific restitution is
return of the very asset that was taken; value restitution, which is awarded when specific
restitution is impossible or impracticable, provides a monetary substitute for the expropriated
asset.2 Time usually determines which form of restitution is involved. Where claims are based
on events long since past (as in the case of claims by Native Americans based on illegal land
sales that occurred during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries), value restitution will be
2

The distinction between specific and value restitution can accurately be expressed in
terms of the distinction, developed in American law-and-economics scholarship, between
“property rules” and “liability rules.” The property rule/liability rule distinction can be used to
shed considerable light on the entire question of reparations, especially with respect to the
difference between specific and value restitution. For present purposes, however, I will not
pursue that line of analysis, which focuses on the issue of transaction costs. Instead, I will focus
on the cognitive problems that the case for property reparations faces.
The seminal work developing the property rules/liability rules distinction is Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, Harvard Law Review
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the only practical remedy. In many of the recent European claims for reparations, both types of
restitution are involved.3
I will discuss two arguments that pose problems for the case for specific restitution for
illegitimate land expropriations. The first, which is less familiar in discussions of restorative
justice, is that cognitive errors are likely to creep into assessments of causal attribution and
resulting moral and legal entitlements. These cognitive errors results from the facts that causal
attributions depend on counterfactual thinking. The second objection is based on the pragmatic
need for repose. Both objections are relevant to any form of reparation, but they obtain greater
strength in the case of claims for specific restitution, as I will discuss. Both of these objections
derive from the effect of time on the strength of claims for reparations. This fact alone counsels
against any flat rule either favoring or blocking recognition of claims for reparations.
Differences in the amount of time that has passed between the expropriation and the statement of
a claim should be taken into account in assessing the strength of claims.
Another factor that varies the strength of specific restitution claims concerns the character
of the asset whose return is sought. While the loss of many assets can be compensated through
awards of monetary damages, other assets do not translate into money at all. These case for
specific restitution is perhaps strongest with respect to these non-commodifiable assets. The
final part briefly considers this concern.

3

See Michael L. Ne, Note, Eastern Europe’s Policy of Restitution of Property in the
1990s, 10 Dick. J. Int’l L. 357 (1992).
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF RECTIFICATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING
A. The Principle of Rectification
The case for property reparations rests on the antecedent moral principle of rectification.4
Robert Nozick has explained the principle’s application to property distribution this way:
This principle uses historical information about previous situations and injustices done in
them [including unjustified expropriations of property], and information about the current
course of events that flowed from these injustices, until the present, and it yields a
description (or descriptions) of [property] holdings in the society. The principle of
rectification presumably will make its best estimate of subjunctive information about
what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred,
using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of
holdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of
the descriptions must be realized.
Philosophers have debated the moral soundness of this principle, but let us accept it, at least in
some version, for present purposes. Accepting the principle provisionally, the question then
becomes, does the principle of rectification always require that new political regimes redress
victims of wrongful state expropriations. In particular, must the righting of such past wrongs
take the form of specific restitution? Examining this question requires that we first identify and
understand the cognitive basis for acting on the principle of rectification: counterfactuals.
B. Counterfactuals and the Attribution of Causality
Implementing the principle of rectification through reparations of any form requires that
we act on the basis of counterfactual thinking. By “counterfactual thinking,” I mean alternative
4

I elide here the distinction drawn by Jeremy Waldron between the counterfactual and
restorative approaches to reparations. See Jeremy Waldron, Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance
and Supersession, in Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society, pp. 139, 146. As Waldron
himself acknowledges, the line between these two approaches is very fine, and the two often
blend together. In any event, I am concerned in this part of the paper with the counterfactual
basis for specific restitution. The next part of the paper addresses a problem that more directly
affects the restorative approach.
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(i.e., factually untrue) versions of past outcomes. It is, quite literally, the mental undoing of the
past. Counterfactual thinking is the necessary cognitive foundation for any attempt positively to
act on the principle of rectification.
Counterfactual statements are usually conditional in form. A contrary-to-the truth factual
antecedent is followed by an alternative outcome. For example, the claim, “If President
Kennedy had not been assassinated, then America would not have gotten into the Vietnam War,”
follows the classic counterfactual form.
In recent years psychologists have extensively researched counterfactual thinking.
Psychologists have studied both the factors underlying the generation of counterfactual thinking
and the consequences of these factors. One generative factor especially important for present
purposes is motive. Motivational differences contribute substantially to both the quantity and
quality of counterfactual thinking. Since counterfactual thinking represents the undoing of past
events, individuals are much more apt to engage in such thinking the more that the past events
are painful or otherwise aversive to them. The counterfactual is an attempt to undo the undesired
outcome cognitively. On this view, “outcome-based motivational factors constitute the engine
driving counterfactual thinking.”5
The second stage in this process is the search for some alterable factual antecedent, i.e., a
means by which the undesired outcome could have been avoided. Factors affecting the
alterability, or mutability, of the factual antecedent (i.e., the “if” clause) in turn influence the
antecedent’s specific content. The most common mutability factors are exceptionality, the

5

Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Counterfactual Thinking: A Critical Overview, in Neal
J. Pose and James M. Olson, eds., What Might Have Been: The Social Psychology of
Counterfactual Thnking (Mahway, NJ, 1995), pp. 1, 10.
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action-inaction effect, and controllability. For example, the more an antecedent is (or is regarded
as) being exceptional, the greater its mutability and, therefore, the greater its role in generating
the counterfactual.
An important consequence of counterfactual generation is the attribution of causality to
events. All counterfactual have causal implications.
C. Counterfactuals, Transitory Justice, and Specific Restitution
Counterfactual thinking can and does serve many positive functions, but it can also be
dysfunctional. Counterfactuals are similar to heuristics; they are a way of coping with
experience, of problem-solving by creating categories and stereotypes.6 Like heuristics, they
help us cope, but often at the cost of biases and judgment mistakes. The salient concern for
purposes of this conference is that counterfactual thinking, the mental undoing of past events, is
apt to trigger responses more emotional than reactions to actual events. [examples] Such
responses influence our judgments about how to behave in the future, leading us to overreact.
[examples]
The link between counterfactual thinking and overreaction has important implications for
the general issue of transitory justice, including specific restitution for property expropriations.
It poses serious questions about whether our collective judgments concerning who gets what can
be trusted. Specifically, the link raises questions about the fairness of decisions concerning who
gets relief and what that relief is.

6

See Steven Sherman and Allen R. McConnell, Dysfunctional Implications of
Counterfactual Thinking: When Alternatives to Reality Fail Us, in Roese and Olson supra, pp.
199, 203.
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Fairness concerns exist because unless current regimes are prepared to grant restitution to
everyone who make a credible claim (a highly unlikely response), they will have to distinguish
among a large number of claims, granting some while denying others on the basis of
counterfactual analysis. Research on the psychological effects of counterfactual reasoning casts
serious doubt that such distinctions can be made in a consistent and rational way. Decision
makers are apt to overreact to some cases and underreact to others because of differences in
mutable antecedent factors involved in the cases. People tend strongly to focus on more mutable
factors, but those factors may not be rationally connected with either causation of the outcome
or, therefore, with the merits of the claims.7 Imagine, for example, two claimants demanding that
buildings expropriated from them by the Polish communist government be returned. The first
claimant is a member of the Habsburg family. His house is a palace which he inherited from his
ancestors many years before the communist government confiscated it shortly after taking power
in the late 1940s. The second claimant is a former businessman who had acquired his modest
house just a few months before the communists seized it. He now wants its return.
Psychological research indicates that people are likely to treat the two cases differently on the
basis of the difference in the time when each claimant acquired his property. The research has
established that the temporal sequence of events in a strong factor that biases attributions of
cause and implications about relative desert. Specifically, this research shows that events that
occur later in a sequential chain of events are more mutable that events that occur earlier in time.8

7

Sherman & McConnell, p. 204.
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D.T. Miller & S. Gunasegaram, Temporal Order and the Perceived Mutability of Events:
Implications for Blame Assignment, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59:1111
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Later events are seen as more causal and are given greater weight in making judgments about
blame, desert, and implications for the future.
The temporal sequence influences the thinking of both the affected individual and others
who are in a position to make judgments about that individual’s situation. The two claimants in
my hypotheticals are likely to experience different reactions to the expropriations of their
property. The second claimant is apt to have a stronger more exaggerated reaction, based on the
fact that he acquired his house shortly before the communists took power. This fact leads him to
think “If only I had waited on buying the house” or “If only I had spent the money on something
else” or “If only the communists had taken power a few weeks earlier.” Such thoughts of regret
will in turn strengthen his affective reaction to the expropriation, producing a more intense
feeling of the unfairness of that event and, consequently, how deserving he is of the building’s
return. The same reactions are likely to occur to the third party who must judge the merits of the
claim. He, too, is apt to view the second claimant as worthier than the first, on the basis of the
different temporal sequences of events in the two cases. Yet this analysis is not rational because
the temporal sequence had no bearing on the cause of expropriation or on the merits of the two
claims.9 In all relevant respects the two cases are alike and should be treated similarly, either
allowing or denying claims for restitution, but in fact they are likely to be treated differently.
The point can be stated more generally. Our sympathies and our responses to claims for
expropriations are not going to map any single normative theory. Cognitive responses to
counterfactual thinking are morally inconsistent and unprincipled. Our responses are quirky,
based on factors that have no moral relevance. Counterfactuals lead our responses to be based

9

See Sherman & McConnell, p. 204.
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on more emotional content, having greater or lesser sympathy for individuals who are in all
relevant respects similarly situated. This undermines the possibility that a policy based on
counterfactual analysis will in fact effectuate any moral principle. From the moral of view, then,
counterfactual analysis is self-defeating.
An obvious response to this point is that it implies that we should throw the baby out with
the bath. Conceding (at least arguendo) that specific restitution for past injustices may be
awarded erratically and inconsistently doesn’t warrant never awarding it . Just because our
efforts at achieving transitory justice may be inconsistent shouldn’t lead us to conclude that it
should never be attempted. There may be times when we are unsure whether and to what
specific restitution is required or justified, but surely there are times when there is no room for
such doubt. At such times, we should trust our moral intuitions. Failing to do so out of a fear of
getting it wrong only compounds the injustice originally perpetrated.
This is an important point, one that we should take seriously. My argument, however, is
not to propose a blanket rejection of all compensation for past expropriations. Rather, it is to
counsel against reacting on the basis of our emotional responses to the claims of dispossessed
property owners. Reparation claims are an unusually emotionally charged category of legal
claims. No decent person can help feeling moved by the stories of petitioners who experienced,
sometimes personally, sometimes through ancestors, the horrors of brutal regimes like Soviet
Europe and the so-called Third Reich. Our instinct is to want to do something for the victims of
inhuman government policies. This is exactly why caution is especially important in this
context. Current regimes must resist the instinctual urge broadly to dispense compensation to
past owners and their successors.
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Counterfactual thinking has dysfunctional effects in a second respect as well. Apart from
the problem of fairness, where the problem is with the comparative treatment of cases,
counterfactual thinking has negative implications for our analysis of the merits of claims
standing alone. Even if the counterfactual accurately tells us (as more often than not it does not)
how things would have turned out had the antecedent factor (i.e., the “if” clause) been different,
it does not tell us what our response should be today. That is, the counterfactual itself does not
warrant any particular normative response. Yet counterfactual thought strongly tends to lead us
to believe that there is a single correct response that follows from it.
In the context of restitution claims, the counterfactual line of thinking that inevitably
precedes our conclusion distorts our judgments about what justice requires of us now. It leads us
to want to undo the antecedent event to which we attribute causal responsibility for the injustice.
The brute fact, though, is that we simply cannot undo the past. What makes specific restitution
seem so appealing is that it appears to be the way return us to the status quo ante, but specific
restitution does not and cannot do that. The expropriated asset may be returned to its former
owner, but much else has changed over time. The asset was used by someone else, possibly in a
capacity that affected many other people. Specific restitution does not merely return these
individuals to their status quo prior to the expropriation for they may well have made different
choices (or had different choices made for them) had their not been an expropriation and
redistribution of the asset. The clock simply cannot be turned back. We are in a zero-sum
situation or something possibly worse. Returning the asset to A means taking it away from B
(and possibly C, D, and E). Such a solution may not be what justice requires of us or indeed
what it permits. Counterfactual thinking clouds our ability to reason through what justice, as
distinguished from emotion, demands of us.
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II. THE PROBLEM OF TIME
“[T]ime seems to mitigate or at least to muddy injustice.”10
“Our intuitions are that [reparatory] claims generally weaken over time.”11
As these quotations suggest, several commentators regard the effect of time on reparation
claims problematic. There are good reasons for these qualms. The western law of property is
replete with rules and doctrines that reflect the insight that at least certain rights fade over time.
The law of prescription and the related law of adverse possession are but two obvious
examples.12 Many legal entitlements that were fully recognizable in the past do not survive
today. To see whether entitlement claims for reparations fall into this category, we need to
understand why we often treat time as corrosive of past entitlements.
One reason recurs to the principle of rectification to which I referred earlier. The
substantive foundation of that principle is the idea that the moral justification for protecting a
person’s entitlement originally lies in the role that the entitlement plays in that person’s life. If I
own a piece of land and use it in some way, the land becomes an important element in how I
shape my life, both now and in the future. So, if someone takes that land from me without my
permission, that act disrupts my life and activity, altering my plans in some unintended and nontrivial way. The principle of rectification represents both an attempt to remedy that disruption so
that my life course is restored to the my original plans. The difficulty with this justification,

10

Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A Relational and
Comparative Approach, in Property Law on the Threshold of the 21st Century, G.E. van Maanen
and A.J. van der Walt eds. (Antwerp 1996), p. 417 (italic omitted).
11
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Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York 2000), p. 138 (footnote omitted).

See generally the essays in the symposium entitled Time, Property Rights, and the
Common Law, published in the Washington University Law Quarterly, 64 (1986): 667.
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however, is the fact that “[i]f something was taken from me decades ago, the claim that it now
forms the centre of my life and that it is still indispensable to the exercise of my autonomy is
much less credible.”13 If the thing has been gone from me for a significant period of time, it can
no longer, in any meaningful sense, be said to be essential to my life. As circumstances change,
for whatever reason, people move on with their lives. They change their plans. Things that were
important to them once fade in significance, and are replaced by other things. Indeed, these
changes may become so great that there has been a fundamental change in their identities, their
selves. They may in truth say, with Dickens’ Scrooge, “I am not the man I once was.”14
The second reason why time usually affects the viability of entitlement-claims is that
circumstances, including surrounding material conditions, change over time. We do not usually
evaluate the existence or strength of any right, including property claims, in total isolation from
other factors. Unless we are prepared to do so, property claims weaken with time. This is not
simply because memories fade, witnesses die or become inaccessible, or other evidentiary
concerns arise. More fundamental are concerns growing out of the redistributive aspects of
specific restitution as a form of reparations. There are two different concerns here. The first is
the fact that the current owner-possessor of the asset may not be the person or entity who
expropriated the asset. Specific restitution involves literally taking asset x, now in B’s hands,
and giving it to A, the original owner. (I am assuming away here the quite substantial
complication that A may not be the original owner but her heir or some other successor of the

13
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Waldron, Historic Injustice, p. 158.

For an extraordinarily sophisticated account of the phenomenon of “multiple selves,”
see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984). The general matter of the implications of
multiple selves for the coherence of claims to reparations for past expropriations is a fascinating
and undeveloped problem that I cannot explore in this brief paper.
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original owner’s rights.) This redistribution is easiest to justify, both as a matter of corrective
justice and distributive justice, if B is the person or entity who wrongfully took the asset from A
in the first place. Suppose, for example, that the original owner of a farm now seeks its from a
government that expropriated the land some time in the past but later changed its policy and now
permits restitution of expropriated property. Here the redistribution from B to A seems, all else
being equal, seems fair. But this scenario will be rare. More commonly, the current ownerpossessor of the farm or other expropriated asset will be a person or entity other than the one
who perpetrated the original wrongful act. In the typical case, where the expropriation was
committed by a government, the current owner-possessor is likely to be either a successor
government, one that followed a radical rupture from the preceding government, or a person or
institution to whom the expropriating government transferred the asset. In either case the current
owner-possessor is an innocent party, someone who had no part in the expropriation. Under
these circumstances, correction of a past injustice through specific restitution is a redistribution
that itself constitutes government expropriation that can reasonably be considered wrongful.
This restitutionary expropriation is not inherently or categorically less wrongful than the original
expropriation. The argument that it is not wrongful rests on the contention that it undoes a past
wrong. But the original expropriation may likewise have been committed for the purpose of
undoing past wrongs, i.e., the then-existing distribution of assets was, in the expropriator’s view,
unjust. That is, the original expropriation was committed as an act of justice. The difference
between the justifications for the two acts of expropriations, of course, is that one (the second)
was done in the interest of corrective justice while the original act was based on distributive
justice. Any argument that seeks to legitimate one but not the other, then, must establish that one
form of justice is morally privileged over the other, and that will not a very difficult task, one
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that is inherently contestable. The point is not that the case cannot be made but rather that it is
far more difficult than many proponents of specific restitution recognize.15
The second concern is with second-order redistributive effects. In addition to the current
owner herself, other people may well be affected by the shift in the asset’s ownership and
possession. Even if B is not innocent, other innocent people may be adversely affected by the
redistribution. This will be the case, for example, if the asset is a building used by the state, both
the current state and its socialist predecessor, for public purposes, such as health or welfare. To
put the point more concretely, imagine that the building is a former palace that was ancestral
home of an aristocratic family and now used as a state mental-health hospital. The claimants are
the heirs of the original owner, now deceased. They no longer live in the country where the
building is located, and despite the injuries inflicted upon them in the past, they are now quite
well-off. The state, which now owns the building, is financially strapped. Its resources already
stretched too thin, it will not be able to purchase or build a substitute for the current building if
specific restitution is ordered. There are too few beds in mental-health hospitals already, so there
is no place to relocate the existing hospital’s patients. They will be left without professional
care or, quite possibly, without any care whatsoever. The apparently simple redistributive act of

15

Martha Minow argues that subsequent owners of unjustly expropriated property cannot
be regarded as innocent because they have benefitted from the expropriation. Martha Minow,
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Boston, 1998), p. 108. I find this argument too quick.
Why should one person’s enrichment be regarded as unjust simply because it is the result of
another person’s unjust act? Unless the current owner has in some way participated in the
injustice (and, in my judgment, participation in the injustice require more than the passive state
of holding the fruit of the injustice), it is not at all clear why, from the moral point of view, that
person should share responsibility for the injustice with the perpetrator. This is not too say that
cogent arguments for responsibility cannot be made. It is too say that the case for attributing
responsibility to that individual is not obvious. In any event, Minow does not even attempt to
provide any such argument.
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transferring title from B to A’s successors in fact has much more complex redistributive
consequences. These redistributive consequences must be taken into account into any argument
favoring specific restitution of previously expropriated property.
III. SPECIFIC RESTITUTION OF NON-COMMODITY ASSETS
Thus far I have suggested that the case for specific restitution of unjustly expropriated
property faces serious normative objections. To a considerable extent these objections can be
avoided by making reparations that are monetary in character, especially if the reparations are
strictly symbolic. There is one category of assets as to which the case for specific restitution
seems far more compelling. It is those assets whose meaning and value defies all attempt at
translating into monetary terms. I call these “non-commodity assets.” I have in mind assets like
ancient Indian burial grounds. What distinguishes such assets from others is the fact that their
core purpose is not to enable their owners to satisfy personal preferences but to create a sense of
identity for their owners, individual or collective. Such assets merit greater protection, through
specific restitution rather than through monetary compensation, precisely because money cannot
compensate for what has been lost, namely, a sense of self or identity.
The case for specific restitution of non-commodity assets faces several possible
objections, not all of which can be addressed here. One that merits attention now, however, is
the question how one can distinguish commodity from non-commodity assets. There is no
obvious means by which objectively to determine which assets are so essential to self-identity
that they legitimately warrant protection through specific restitution. One approach worth
serious consideration is to distinguish between individually-owned assets and group-owned
assets. It is at least arguable that no individually-owned asset should not be treated as a noncommodity asset because to do otherwise would create a serious risk that many former owners
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will claim that their ancestral property are non-commodity assets. It does not seem at all farfetched to suppose that there are many former owners of farms, family homes, heirlooms, and
similar assets who sincerely believe that these assets, just because they have passed down
through several generations within the family, are integral to their sense of self and personal
identity. Without necessarily denying the legitimacy of these beliefs, such claims should not be
single out for special treatment. Doing so would create a serious risk that the entire system of
reparations will be burdened by such claims. There is simply no objective basis for determining
whether one such claim is legitimate while another is not.
One can, however, objectively distinguish between individually-owned and group-owned
assets with respect to their status as a non-commodity assets. There is more likely to be a
continuing connection between a particular asset and a sense of identity in the case of group
assets. As Jeremy Waldron has observed, “Religions and cultural traditions we know are very
resilient, and the claim that the lost lands form the center of a present way of life–and remain
sacred objects despite their loss-may be as credible a hundred years on as it was at the time of the
dispossession.”16 Precisely because the connection between specific assets and a group’s identity
typically endures for long periods of time it is much easier to say with some sense of confidence
that the asset is and remains a non-commodity asset. This seems especially so with respect to
religious property. It is also likely to be true with respect to assets owned by “discrete and
insular groups,” such as the native peoples of North America. In the context of claims such as
these, the case for specific restitution seems much stronger than in other contexts. At least. Such
a limited approach to specific restitution seems far less likely to arouse widespread public
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Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, p. 19.
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resentment than a general program of specific restitution.
CONCLUSION
In this very brief paper I have suggested two reasons why reparations in the form of
specific restitution for unjustly expropriated property should be awarded only in exceptional
cases. Specific restitution is a unique form of reparations. It is neither the only nor the best
means of recognizing the legitimacy of claims brought by the many victims of atrocities
committed in the past half-century. The tragic fact is that no form of reparation can truly
compensate those who have endured so much. We have only inadequate choices available to us.

